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Towards Illiberal Conditioning? New Politics of Media Regulations in 
Poland (2015-2018) 
In this article we focus on public media policy changes, asking what and how media policy 
proposals aid de-democratisation in Poland. The article unfolds the logic underpinning the new 
politics of media regulations and argues that these paint a nuanced picture of democratic 
backsliding in Poland. Drawing from media policies, policy-makers’ statements and media 
industry insights, this critical analysis of the discourse on public media policy in Poland 
analyzes exogenous and endogenous political shifts revealing the rise of illiberal trends at the 
cross-roads of the Polish hybrid media system, democracy and society. In relation to public 
media policy, illiberal political trends, we find, display features of centralisation of power, 
cultural politics, political partisantship and social polarisations. Indicative of democratic 
backsliding, these are steps towards de-democratisation which we explain using with the 




This article focuses on the process of public media policy making in Poland. It explores the 
interplay between political trends, media governance and ways in which their dynamics re-define 
state-citizens relations. Following the appointment of the Law and Justice (org. Prawo i 
SprawiedliwoWć, abbr. PiS) majority Government in October 2015, laws were put forward, re-
setting orientation for public media policy which, in turn, shook up public media sector. 
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Subsequently, the Government was widely criticised for deteriorating standards of democracy. 
Poland is one of the most prominent cases, often compared to Hungary, of how political actors 
adapt fast-paced policy making undermining democratic governance (Cianetti et al. 2018; 
Hanley and Vachudova, 2018). These trends of democratic backsliding, which according to 
Bermeo (2016, p. 5), are “often used, rarely analyzed” comprises of multiple processes and 
agents, and “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that 
sustain an existing democracy”. Since 2015, sliding backwards in Poland implies that a political 
actor that won the parliamentary majority aims to concentrate executive control over public 
institutions.  
 
Putting forward and introducing 2015-2016 public media policies were symptomatic of the PiS 
Government’s governance style and, after a constitutional crisis, their introduction furthered 
public concerns about illiberal trends. Arguably, this sensu largo approach to democratic 
governance, unfolding in different areas of politics, goes beyond the scope of this article. We do, 
however, recognise that the parliamentary opposition and civic organisations in Poland alerted 
public opinion to threats associated with media policies put forward by the PiS. For the purpose 
of this article, however, we take sensu stricto approach to public media policy and, while 
interested in social change stemming from it, our departure point is the struggle over the process 
of policy making. Our main focus is on the 2016 ‘Big Media Act’, but we refer to the 2015 
‘Small Media Act’ turning the PiS’s “good change” manifesto into public media policy.  
 
We explore how changes to the orientation of media policy emerging in Poland since 2015 align 
with illiberal trends in politics and, in turn, translate into the architecture of a particular public 
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media space. Keeping in mind that “media policy creates the communicative space within which 
all public and decision-making discourses take place” (Braman,  2004, p. 169), our analytical 
foci are the governance features that the PiS Government’s media policy introduces, including 
their political background, cultural and ideological underpinnings and social changes stemming 
from the public media as a space for political communication. Following Garnham’s (1988, p. 
210) definition of media policy as “the ways in which public authorities shape, or try to shape, 
the structures and practices of the media”, we contribute to the debate on media policy research 
beyond endogenous trends in the field (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 2008) and reveal new, 
exogenous pressures on Poland’s hybrid media system unfold in public media sector. We make 
sense of public media policy changes by asking the following research questions:  
 
RQ1. What public service media policy changes have been put forward and introduced?  
RQ2. What are the key governance features underpinning these media policies? 
RQ3. How do political trends in Poland link with the making of public service media policies? 
RQ4. How do, if at all, media policies instigate social changes impacting citizens in Poland? 
 
To address these questions,  we contextualise our analysis in existing academic literature on 
illiberal trends in politics as well as research focusing on public media policy research in Poland. 
We then propose aconceptual framework, which is followed by methodological underpinnings 
of our analysis. Presentation of key insights emerging from policy analysis is, finally, followed 






Sleep-Walking Into Illiberalism 
 
Given that illiberal trends have emerged in Europe in various settings in Hungary, Russia and 
the United Kingdom, it is safe to assume that illiberalism is a trend transcending differnet types 
of political regimes and institutions. The political powers turning and twisting this trend are 
complex and, in Poland, one of its early manifestations unfolded at the crossroads of politics, 
media policy and public service media, springing concerns about democratic governance. The 
early voices pointing to the treats associated with illiberal trends did not, however, emerge in 
media studies. Political science foregrounded them a while ago. For example, Puchalska (2005, 
p. 816) argues that “authoritarian, exclusive and undemocratic style of politics of the first years 
of reforms, squandered social trust and undermined the potential which this democratic revival 
represented (…)”. Shields (2015, p. 669) speaks about “a subtle appeal to neo-liberal market 
reforms in amongst the populist and illiberal politics that seek to replace existing class based 
representative institutions and practices”. Kubik (2012, p. 80) problematises illiberalism “as a 
political option that is based on three principles: (1) populism, (2) (organizational) antipluralism, 
and (3) ideological monism”. Most recently, Grzebalska and PetQ (2018, p. 167) conceptualised 
institutional illiberal changes taking place in Poland and Hungary as ‘polypore state’ to theorise 
how illiberal elites in Hungary and Poland appropriate resources from existing policies and 
funding infrastructure of the European Union (the EU). In the light of the conducted literature 
review, it transpires that media studies focus on democratisation rather than de-democratisation 
(Sparks, 2008). Subsequently, research has placed Poland on the map of analysis of media 
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‘oligarchisation’ (ŠtEtka, 2012), media commercialisation (Dobek-Ostrowska and Głowacki, 
2015) media convergences (Szczepaniak, 2011) and media fragmentation (Zielonka, 2015).  
 
The market presence of digital media companies, changing patterns of media consumption, new 
ways of making of political news, and hyper-campaigning has made the logic of hybrid media in 
Poland more pronounced than ever before. Whilst this process is recognised as an explicit feature 
of media systems in the CEE region (Surowiec and ŠtEtka, 2017), the politics of media policy 
remains under-studied. The bulk of existing research focuses on the frameworks regualting the 
interactions between ‘new’ and ‘old’ media (Gulyás and Hammer, 2013). The research on public 
media reveals (StCpka, 2010) a few pronouncable tendencies towards, on the one hand, 
commercialisation and, on the other hand, ongoing political interference into the sector (Lauk, 
2009). Undertaking the task of exploring public media policy, Jakubowicz’s (2004) normative 
analysis suggests that policy makers in Poland tend to maneuver between mimetic and atavistic 
public service media policies orientations. Unlike in this normative conceptualisation of media 
policy, we question this predominantly binary dynamics, and provide context-specific evidence 
of multi-dimensional tensions and power relations underpinning public media policy making.  
 
Public Media Policy Research 
Over the past decades, the analysis of media policy in Poland was inextricably tied with the 
process of democratisation (Goban-Klas, 1990, Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006; 2011). Research on 
media systems in the post-Soviet Central Eastern Europe has focused on media policy and the 
regulatory framework concerning issues such as ownership, media freedom and media 
accountability (Gross, 2002; Paletz and Jakubowicz, 2003; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008). This 
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scholarship acknowledges that democratisation of Polish media system took unpredictable turns 
in comparison to other public institutions. In the field of media policy research, the Polish media 
system has been described as particularly volatile to political interference from the National 
Broadcasting Council (org. KRRiT) (Głowacki, 2008). Both empirical studies and descriptive 
accounts of media policy demonstrate that public media and the governing body were of 
particular interest to Polish political parties, which either aimed at shaping media regulations 
(Goban-Klas, 1996) or, using politically-motivated appointments, strived to control the KRRiT.  
 
Media policy research tends to highlight media pluralism as the main pillar for the continuity of 
democratisation in Poland’s media system (Klimkiewicz, 2017). Other studies provide more 
complex picture. For instance, Sparks (2008, p.13) argues that in contrast to the official media of 
the state socialist era, media in Poland is marketised and plural. However, at the same time, it 
remains under the watch of elite groups, instead of adapting its orientation towards publics.  
 
Apart from party politics, the orientation of public media policy has been shaped by foreign 
ownership and, in the absence of strong journalistic cultures, is filled by corporate cultures of 
transnational media organisations (Gross, 2004). Consequently, the above dynamics surrounding 
public media policy define the features of political communication culture including: accusation 
of incompetence between politicians and journalists, struggle for professional distance between 
these two types of actors and breaches to rules at the interactions between them (Pfetsch and 
Voltmer, 2012). These insights accentuate the significance of media governance for democracy 
in Poland. However, with the exception of the article by Głowacki (2015), arguing that more 
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needs be done to understand ties between media regulations and trends in politics, there are no 
studies exploring links between media policy and illiberal trends in politics. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Governmentality, Media Policy And Political 
Disruption 
 
Our framework rests on three pillars. To aid the analysis of the politics of public media policy, 
we draw from the discursive tradition of media policy research (Steeter, 2013). First, given that 
we are interested in the shifts in the orientation of regulations, we draw form the conceptual 
oeuvre of media policy. We use the discursive notion of media policy in conjunction with 
Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. For Foucault (1982, p. 790) “to govern, in this sense, is to 
structure the possible field of action of others”. There are two aspects of governmentality that are 
relevant to our analysis. The former is the principle method for the rationalization of 
governmental practices (Foucault, 1989). The latter, in Foucauldian tradition, “seeks in its own 
ways the integration of the self-conduct of the governed into the practices of their government 
and the promotion of correspondingly appropriate techniques of self” (Burchell, 1996, p. 29).  
 
Second pillar refers to Freedman’s (2008, p. 14) concept of ‘media governance’. It is broader 
than statutory media regulation and implies the “sum total of mechanisms, both formal and 
informal, national and supranational, centralized and dispersed, that aim to organize media 
systems”. According to Puppis (2010, p. 139) this concept is of substantial value for media 
policy research as “it is a new way of describing, explaining, and criticizing the entirety of forms 
of rules that aim to organize media systems”. It allows bridging the Foucauldian notion of 
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governmentality with public media as ‘technology citizenship’ (Nolan, 2006, p. 233). This 
approach proposes that ci izens’ identities are made up by the interactions between different 
authorities, different ways of understanding the concept of ‘public’, and in empirical terms, to 
demonstrate ways in which media policies approach Polish citizens and collective governance. 
 
Third pillar of our framework, is in line with the current advancements in the field of political 
communication, and extends to reseach on media policy. Following the recent developments on 
the disruptive features in political communication (Bennett and Pfetsch, 2018, p. 244), the 
process that is triggered by “attacks on traditional media as elitist”, we strive to move the debate 
about Poland’s public media beyond the normative assumptions about democratising power of 
public media. We are interested in the implications that the media policy has for political 
conditioning (Lilleker, 2014) of citizens as well as inquiring about the role policy has in the re-
setting of architecture for political communication in Poland. 
Discursive Archive and Analytical Approach 
In this article, we employ an interpretive approach to media policy, which invites the study of 
policy as part of the specific socio-cultural contexts rather than technocratic expert-driven 
endeavor. In epistemic terms, media policy is not analysed in the vacuum, but rather as entangled 
in political and cultural struggles over meanings associated with its zeitgeist. As Streeter (2013, 
p. 495) suggests: “discoursively oriented work on policy has become a contributor to 
understanding the social construction of modern institutions”. Discoursive struggles over 
meaning are best captured through the study of tranformations. In this respect, the Foucauldian 
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approach (1972) to discourse is the one enabling us to address research questions (see, p. 3) by 
focusing on the process of  policy making, its socio-political contexts and social change.  
 
Discourse is a set of statements, which provides language for talking about and representing 
knowledge, objects, subjects and practices. Our aim is also to explore how issues of media policy 
are entangled with often value-laden questions of subjectivitivities between ‘public’, ‘civic’ and 
‘national’ interests. The Foucauldian approach enables to focus on how key institutions of media 
policy making in Poland construct their knowledge subjects, how the policy orientation impacts 
public media and how, in return, those translate into social changes. It also allows us to focus on 
the types of statements which are foregrounded, backgrounded and those that are silenced.  
 
Our sampling is based on the principles of politically significant cases selected on the basis of 
their significance to the direction of changes presented by public media policy. Purposive 
sampling is a common place in the studies on public policy (Sam, 2019) or media policy (Nolan, 
2006). In this study, however, it is particularly useful as it enabled us to focus on the making of 
public media policies of a landmark significance, and the one that attracted a lot of attention 
among social groups and think-tanks, governments, the EU, and journalists alike (Chapman, 
2017). The selection of the regulatory documents making up the analysed public media policy 
orientation was guided by policy makers and, in that sense, we followed their making.  
 
The archive of 119 documents (ranging from 1 to 51 pages) includes detailed minutes of 
proceedings from the hearing on media policy; legal acts, policy proposals, media statements, 
press releases, reports (e.g. think-tanks) and commentaries by media industry actors. We have 
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identified the following strands making up the discourse on the emergent public media policy 
orientation: contextualisation strand; legitimisation strand (consultancy documents, policy 
positions); expert comments strand (e.g. though leadership); the law strand (the legal Acts) - 
statements of which each are interconnected. Additional in-depth reading of the archive led us to 
the identification of four main themes, which in Foucauldian terminology are called 
‘dispositives’. Dispositives are defined as formations with the dominant strategic function of 
responding to an urgent need at a given historical moment (Foucault, 1980). These include: the 
structural and governance changes to the public media sector; cultural principles for media 
governance, and finally, the impact of policy on political communication and its significance for 
citizens. We report them as findings in relation to our research questions. 
Re-Positioning of Public Service Media 
In this section we report findings pertaining to the policy changes put forward by policy makers 
(RQ1). In here, we focus primarily on the foregrounded statements present in the legitimising 
strand of the discourse on the 2016 ‘Big Media Act’. This policy was put forward by a group of 
MPs as a three-tier regulation on national media, audiovisual fee and executive decrees 
(Broadcasting and Culture Commission, 2016). Of the three Acts submitted to the Parliament on 
21 April, 2016, none was passed in the original shape, and another legislation – the 2016 
‘National Media Council Act’ - was put forward to replace the 2015 ‘Small Media Act’. The 
‘National Media Council Act’ was passed by the Parliament on 22 June, 2016 as a measure to 
regulate the appointments of executives and the boards of public service media. This Act filled 
the vacuum for some regulations articulated in the draft of the ‘Big Media Act’, but was met with 
widely public criticism. Its draft proposal assumed that the National Media Fund would appoint 
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executives and the boards of directors (Articles 22-25), establish the Social Programming 
Councils (Articles 29-38) and set up the National Media Council (Articles 39-47). The Chair of 
the Council was given both concession to lead the appointments of directors of public media and 
governance of the National Media Fund. Given that the 2016 Act policy has not been introduced, 
the Act on National Media Council was introduced to solve procedural issues (see, Appendix 1). 
 
This Act aimed to regulate the scope of the National Media Council, its statutory mandate, 
responsibilities, office of the Chairman, accountibilty and the appointment of public service 
media executives as well as supervisory roles over them. The changes emerging in the National 
Media Council Act attempted to codify media policy changes, also explicit in the public hearing 
on the 2016 ‘Big Media Act’. By the passing of this Act, the status of public service media as the 
state-owned enterprises affiliated with the Treasury has been sanctioned and provided the basis 
for bringing the public service media closer to the Polish state structures and party politics. 
Unlike in the 2015 ‘Small Media Act’, which had triggered staffing changes in the sector, the 
National Media Council was given the power to appoint the boards and executives of public 
service media. This collegiate body, made up of three appointees of the Parliament and two of 
the President, was to choose the candidates from the parliamentary opposition. While this 
solution has moved the appointments away from the Treasury, it remained centred around party 
politics. Further, the opportunities for party control over the Council were explcit in the conflict 
of interest regulations (Article 5) allowing political actors such as MPs to become members of 




The structure of public service media, branded as “National Media”, included the network of 
brodcasters: Polish Television (‘TVP’); Polish Radio (‘PR’), seventeen regional radio stations 
and the Polish Press Agency (‘PAP’) (Article 2). Within this outline, limited attention was paid 
to digital media technologies (Article 11, points 3-5). In addendum to the draft, the Act aimed to 
address challenges associated with digitalisation in the production of ‘on demand’ content, 
innovation in the production techniques and wider relations with digital media technologies 
users. These broad statements were highlighted by representatives of the Citizens’ Pact for 
Public Media foregrounding that the proposed Act did not take the role of the Web-based 
technologies in public media seriously enough (ibid., p. 33-34). Whilst the issues of digital media 
technologies had been brought up during the hearing, also suggestions were made to create a 
specialised ‘public service internet portal’ that would embody the public service mission. 
However, these have not been taken on board and the links between public media and other 
digital technology providers have note been addressed in this particular policy proposal.  
Step Towards ‘Statism’ 
This section focuses on the statements that identify the key governance features of the public 
media policy (RQ 2). Among the themes legitimising the proposed policy, there was a prominent 
commitment to centralise public media closer to the Polish state. Of the three Acts, ‘Na ional 
Media Act’ proposed changing strategic branding of the network from ‘public’ to ‘national’ 
media (Articles 1-2). This was mirrored in the public mission statement. Despite the opposition’s 
calls to ensure media independence, the proposal provided additional controls, particularly by the 
National Media Council and the National Media Fund (Article 7). These bodies constituted an 
additional layer of bureaucracy, moving public media away from the existing regulator, the 
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KRRiT. This re-positiong was further manifested by turning the network of National Media and 
their governing bodies into legal entities (Article 2) as opposed to them being the property of the 
Treasury. This move aimed at changing their status as limited companies, the legal status of 
which was described as “fetishised” in the era of post-transformation (National Media Act, 2016, 
p. 24). The Polish Press Agency was aligned closer to the state, as it has received a status of a 
national institution and it was compelled to disseminate all news releases of governing 
institutions.  
 
With regards to establishing of regulatory bodies, the function of which was to deliver the 
mission of public service brodcasters, the draft proposed (Articles 39-47) the introduction of the 
National Media Council, a body responsible for the appointments of directors of National Media 
and setting up of the Social Programme Councils (Articles 29-38). The National Media Council 
was supposed to have taken over some of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Treasury – 
particularly the appointments of the directors of National Media boards and executives by the 
Chair of the National Media Council (Articles 22-25). The safeguarding role over the public 
mission was tasked to the Social Programming Councils, appointments to which were made from 
candidates who do not directly participate in political life. However, for instance, the Catholic 
Church and labour unions were explicitly listed (Article 29) as being the potential sources for 
appointees, which points to an impact these institutions have on the politics in Poland, and 
traditionalist political legacy they still carry. Setting up of those bodies was deemed contestable, 
because of their undefined relationship to the National Braoadcasting Council (rg. ‘KRRiT’), 
the governing body and a constitutional institution of Polish democracy. For example, during the 
public hearing, their introduction was criticised by the representative of the Polish Chamber of 
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Digital Communication as unconstitutional. Given the advancing trend of media convergences, 
suggestions were made to expand the regulatory scope of the KRRiT with the aim to integrate 
institutions rather than to split them (ibid., p. 22). 
 
Financial Governance  
The policy proposal placed the National Media Fund in charge of the budget of the National 
Media (Article 48). This body was to perform a key role in the execution of the budgetary policy 
of public media. The National Media Fund was deemed responsible for financial reporting to the 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage and to the Ministry of Finance. The financial resources of the 
National Media Fund were to entirely come from public funding, paid alongside energy bills as a 
audiovisual licence fee. The proposal allowed donations to support the public mission of 
National Media. The Fund was to be exclusively supported by the state. This regulation was 
uttered as a policy requirement. For example, Maciej Strzembosz of the Chamber of Audiovisual 
Producers argued for the reduction of adverting as a revenue for public media, whereas Tomasz 
Truskawa of the Freedom of Speech Association argued for the reduction of market competition 
on public media. In the public hearing, the CBOS (2016) poll, according to which 60% of Poles 
do not approve of additional charges, was brought up.  
 
However, the financial situation of the National Media allowed diversification of founding 
sources. They were to come from the National Media Fund, copyrights fees, revenues from news 
services, advertising revenues, sponsored programming, income from affiliated companies, and 
donations from the state budget (Articles 18, 51 and 52). These governance solutions created 
financial regime based on the mixture of public and commercial funding. Such finance regime, 
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however, aimed to set the dominance of public funding, which, stood in the the opposition of 
public opinion poll on the issue. The National Media Council was both holding public media 
finances and act as a supervisory body of the National Media (ibid., p. 4). 
Ideological Revisionism 
In this section, we aim to answer RQ3 by exploring the backgrounded and silenced statements 
pointing to the cultural-ideological underpinnings of policy changes put forward as media policy 
orientation since 2015. We locate them in the context of the public responses that followed those 
changes. Further, the relationship between media policy and political trends is explored in order 
to understand whether, and if so, how, the recent political trends towards illiberalism manifest 
through the lens of media policy changes and civic reactions to them. The public media 
transformation under the PiS Government, already since the first time when the party was in 
power in 2005, has been mainly driven by the ambition to both repolonise public media and 
depoliticise it. Repolonisation (org. ‘repolonizacja’) refers to the efforts aiming at increasing 
domestic ownership in Poland’s financial sector. More specifically, in the media sector, it refers 
to a drive towards increasing domestic ownership on the media system, which in turn, implicitly, 
is likely to make media outlets provide favorable coverage of the current Government (Chapman, 
2017). In practice, it means the turn towards an institutional architecture, which supports 
ideological programme of the PiS and the Government’s policies (see, p. 21).  
 
Repolonisation takes place along depoliticisation, and the first attempt to depoliticise the public 
media was introduction of a temporary ‘Small Media Act’ in 2015. Its goal was to terminate the 
mandate of the current members of the National Media and supervisory boards. In practice, this 
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implied the marginalisation of the role of KRRiT, which meant to, as stated in the Polish 
Constitution (Sejm, 1997, Chapter 9, Art. 213) “safeguard the freedom of speech, the right to 
information, and the public interest in radio and television broadcasting”. Instead of competitions 
organised by the KRRiT, executives and supervisory boards would be directly appointed by the 
Treasury Minister. This Act was put forward to depoliticise the public media, which according to 
the PiS, was serving as propaganda mouthpiece for the formerly governing party, the Civic 
Platform (org. Platforma Obywatelska, abbr. PO). This attempt to change both the leadership and 
staff of the public media was a step towards more partisan control over the KRRiT. The ‘Small 
Media Act’ was eventually superseded by the ‘National Media Council Act’ in 2016. 
 
‘Nationalising’ Public Mission 
In practice the draft aims to transform the existing public media model into a sector of a media 
system promoting the political and ideological program of the Government by developing 
stronger ties between the state and public media (Klimkiewicz, 2017). From cultural and 
ideological perspectives on this shift, particular attention deserves the modification of public 
service mission of the National Media. For instance, in Chapter 1, Article 3 of the Act contains 
provisions on the role and mission of public media, including what should be broadcasted. The 
main goal of public media, according to the Act, is to “preserve national traditions, patriotic and 
human values (…)” and “promotion of the Polish and world science and art” and “contributing to 
the spiritual needs of listeners and viewers”. Some provisions include rather vague statements 
such as “creation of conditions for pluralistic debate about social affairs”. The Article 4 states 
that broadcastings’ institutions would pay attention to the “culture of the Polish language” and 




In Article 9, the draft describes in 23 points the public mission of the media. Accordingly, the 
public media is obliged to “strengthen the national community and responsibility for the 
collective good” (point 2), “enrich historical awareness and counter misrepresentations of Polish 
history” (point 3), provide a “fair portrayal of diverse events in Poland and abroad“ (point 5), 
“promote of free citizen and public opinion” (point 6), “to facilitate citizen and civic 
organizations’ participation in public life through presentation of diverse opinions and positions 
and their right to social control and critique” (point 7). At the same time, the mission of public 
media is also to “portray family values and take steps to strengthen the notion of the family” 
(point 9). Article 11, point 3 also defines public mission of the media in terms of fulfilling of 
“civic, social, cultural, and educational needs of society and its elements”. Interestingly, in a 
document substantiating the draft, it is stated that the Act would guarantee independence of the 
public media from a government and that the main task of institutions of National Media is to 
fulfill the public mission. The document states that in comparison with the previous 1992 public 
media policy, the newer version emphasizes “strengthening of the national community and 
common good, historical awareness and knowledge about Poland abroad” (Article 9, points 2-4).  
Cultural Underpinnings  
The changes to both leadership and staff of the public media prompted protests across Poland, 
including those organised by a social movement, the Committee for Defence of Democracy (the 
KOD). One of the key arguments of the PiS opponents was that the Government was introducing 
direct control over editorial policy and indirect control of media content in order to advance its 
partisan interests. Arguably, the ambition to depoliticise public media have brought the opposite 
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effects. Part of the issue can be related to the fact that the PiS Government made an attempt to 
directly leverage the power of the public media to shape the public opinion that, in turn, could 
serve the governing party. Further, ad hoc consultations served as a measure to legitimise the 
actions undertaken by the PiS Government. In the afore-mentioned public hearing of the 
Broadcasting and Culture Commission, seventy-one speakers of non-governmental organisations 
met on 21 May, 2016 to discuss the proposed policy changes. When it comes to the cultural-
ideological principles underpinning the governance practices of policy makers and public media, 
one can distinguish three topics raised during the hearing: the nature of the mission of public 
media, question of media independence as well as limited transparency in legislative process.  
 
On the one hand, the mission of public media is rather vaguely described in the policy draft. For 
instance, several representatives of civic organizations took up terms such as ‘humanist values’ 
and ‘national community’ as taken for granted and not precisely defined. Also, the notions of 
‘public’ and ‘national’ employed interchangeably in relation to media raise concerns about the 
shift towards partisan, local and anti-European direction of changes in Poland. Similarly, the 
draft received criticism for lacking statements that would clearly define the mission of public 
media in terms of pluralistic coverage, protection against hate speech and respect of minorities. 
The criticism also concerns the fact that a variety of terms used could be interpreted in multiple 
ways. On the other hand, for the PiS supporters and proponents of the new law, public mission of 
the media is tightly connected to the logic and mission of repolonisation of the media, which 
goes beyond the issue of increasing of the domestic ownership of public media sector. Instead, 
the mission concerns silenced statements, which relate to direct control over media content and 




Similarly, independence of public media has been widely questioned. Beside the problems of 
opaque appointment procedure and employment structure to the National Media Council, 
opponents brought up the absence of any legislative guarantees for journalists to secure their 
professional autonomy. In this context, the concept of depoliticisation was described as a cover 
up for strengthening the links between public service media an  the practice of government 
propaganda. For policy makers, however, the latter relates to the practice of decommunisation 
(org. ‘dekomunizacja’) defined as dismantling of the legacies of the state socialism. More 
specifically, it relates to cleansing of the public media from old secret collaborators. Freedom of 
speech, or ‘real freedom of speech’ as one of the public discussants put it, and pluralism are 
discursively employed by the Act’s proponents as facilitators in the processes of 
decommunisation and depoliticisation. Limited transparency in the introducton of the media 
policy was third among the most prominent topics, often brought up by their opponents. It relates 
to the unusual speed of the process as the draft was introduced by the Speaker of the Parliament, 
not via public consultations or “thorough and inclusive public debate” (Klimkiewicz, 2016). 
Additionally, the problem that National Media Council is not a constitutional body with 
executive powers points to the blurring of boundaries between party politics and policy.  
Citizens (Re-)Socialisation and Disrupting Political Communication 
In this section, we address the RQ4 focusing on the ways in which media policy changes set the 
architecture for political communication for citizens in Poland. The mixture of financial 
priorities and cultural shift have underpinned themes defining the ways in which the nexus of 
state-public media-citizens was approached by policy-makers, and consequently acted as an 
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incentive aimed at shifting social relations. In relation to politics, Lilleker (2014, p. 65) defines 
conditioning as a “learned responses to external stimuli that determine cognition and behaviour”. 
 
In the proposed policy, the audiovisual licence fee meant to incentivised citizens to contribute 
further to the mission of the public media, despite limited support for new regulations in this 
area. In turn, this regulation was met with concerns. For example, during the hearing of the 
Broadcasting and Culture Commission  (2016, p. 11-37) statements by speakers for the Citizens 
of Culture exemplify this policy position: “public media is supposed to be civic media, but civic 
does not mean that the only citizens’ right in this definition is the right to pay fees and nothing 
else”. This sentiment echoed beyond financial regulations.   
 
Indeed, public media can be seen as the broadcasting technology for collective governance. The 
cultural shift visible in the proposed policy is the preferred notion of ‘publicness’ that explicitely 
foregrounds collective identities, while at the same time, silencing an inclusive notion of 
‘civicness’ defined in terms of individual identities. The collective identities were put ahead any 
individual identities, and this logic was extended to political conditioning. In the draft of the Act, 
two tasks of public media have been explicitely formulated. The first task was to contribute to 
the comprehensive socialisation of youth and the protection of children from demoralisation 
(Article 9,  point 10), whereas the second task was to cooperate with authorities, churches and 
religious associations, public service organisations and other institutions acting for the common 
good and human good (Article 9, point 23). In the further part of Chapter 2, titled ‘Performing 
Public Mission’, Article 15 deals with the media access of public service organisations and 
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Article 18 with educational programms. In addition, the policy proposal carries a record 
regarding the preservation of family values.  
 
The siginifier ‘national’ was juxtaposed against the public mission of public media. Among the 
general provisions in Chapter 1, the emphasis was put on the public mission of National Media, 
the aim of which is, among others, to popularise forms of civicness (Article 3, point 2). In 
Chapter, 2 dealing with the public mission, Article 9 stipulates that one of their tasks is the 
formation of public opinion (point 6) and enabling citizens and civic organisations to participate 
in public life by presenting diverse views and exercising the right to control and social criticism 
(point 7). However, these provisions were drawn from the media policy codified back in 
December 1992. Whilst freedom of speech was highlighted in this policy proposal, the concerns 
were raised during the public hearing that public media sector is prone to delivery of government 
propaganda at home and abroad, and subjecting citizens to the dominant worldview through the 
prism of imposed, top-down, national traditions, patriotic and Christian values (see, Ch. 2). The 
concerns about these tendencies unfolded in relation to citizens at home and diaspora 
communities as recipients of political communication by the National Media. The attempts to 
introduce mechanisms of control over public media by the state, blurring of boundries between 
media policy and editoral practices, had polarising effects. During the hearing, some speakers 
argued that “philosophy of the Act is based on media capture by one political party. This, in fact, 
would lead to the dramatic situation whereby public media, instead of being a space into which 
everyone can be included, would become another field of the deepening tensions” (Br adcasting 
and Culture Comission, 2016, p. 11) or that “citizens finance the propaganda and comfortable 




The conceptual framework applied in this article has allowed us to approach media policy 
changes in Poland from the perspective of governance in terms of rationalization of practices, but 
also as a process of governing the public. As findings reveal, the policy changes have had a 
rather disruptive impact on the process of political conditioning in Poland turning into the 
direction of illiberal trends in politics. Our findings point to the executive aggrandizement (see p. 
2) as a particular type of democratic backsliding evidenced by the making of public media policy 
in Poland (Bermeo, 2016). This process of disassembling of democratic governance is faciliatetd 
by legal means. In other words, backsliding take place through elected officials and, because of 
that, poseses mandate of legitimacy. Keeping in mind that backsliding does not exclusively 
caused by emotions, oftentimes associated with populism, but rather rational and predictable 
reactions to policy and institutional changes, we argue that public media policy changes in 
Poland is used for the expansion of governmental power. In that regard, the politicisation of 
media policy is a re-occuring feature of illiberal conditioning. The previous PiS Coalition 
Government (2005-07) introduced changes to “br adcasting law and imposed its own appointees 
to leading bodies” (Sparks, 2008, p. 13). However, by setting up the National Media Council, 
policy makers pushed the boundries of control over the appointments of public media executives.  
 
Defined by centralisation of state power (Levy, 2006), this approach demonstrates abuse of 
consensus. By bringing public service media closer to the state, the ‘Big Media Act’ proposal and 
the subsequent ‘Act on the National Media Council’, introduces ‘command and control’ 
governance inspired by the statist imperatives instead of citizens’ interests or social cohesion. In 
doing so, it undermines the KRRiT as a constitutional body. This breaking of the boundries of 
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the self-governence towards the expanding political control was not only theoretical. For 
example, party politics played out via the National Media Council as the Sejm appointed 
Elcbieta Kruk, Krzysztof CzabaMski and Joanna Lichocka, the PiS nominees to the Council. The 
remaining appointees, Janusz Braun and Grzegorz Podcorny, were nominated by the opposition. 
Further, modus operandi of the Council shows favourism towards the PiS. In fact, their spin 
doctor, Jacek Kurski, was appointed as the director of ‘TVP’continuing the governance following 
his appointment under the framework of the ‘Small Media Act’. Finally, the centralisation of 
state power can be illustrated by the new legislatory procedures introduced by the Government, 
namely: a high intensity of parliamentary proceedings over new public media regulations, the 
acceleration of the Sejm’s hearings and public consultations, late votings adding to the overall 
impression that the PiS was trying to rush the legislative process.  
 
Mindful of the fact that in hybrid media systems, news making is the process of ‘boundary-
drawing, boundary-blurring and boundary-crossing’ (Chadwick, 2013, p. 184), we suggest the 
changes to media policy in Poland can be extended to ‘boundary-breaking’ – dismantling of 
democratic rules governing public media. This logic of breaking and pushing the boundaries of 
the public media is linked to populist style through the creation of political demand to revisit 
media system in Poland, first public and later private media. This is a continuation of the 
ongoing trend, in which political actors do not inform the making of media policy on empirical 
evidence, but on the basis of political speculations, which, ex ante, assumes particular outcomes 
of the proposed public media policy without any explicit analysis of its design. This way, media 
policy in Poland is driven by the logic of conditioning of citizens to mechanisms for the creation 
of an institutional space designed on the principles of political monism (Kubik, 2012). This 
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emerging “illiberal bubble” can be defined as an institutional and discursive space, the 
architecture and governence rules of which operate on the basis of state-centred relational set 
up geared towards conditioning of citizens to the vision of a public life inspired by anti-
pluralism, seemingly non-contestable dominant values, celebrated ideological monism, and 
belief-driven features of public life amplified within a public media space. 
 
Based on the nature of the analysed material and its relative novelty we cannot ascertain neither 
the immediate, short term impact of this policy nor the larger socio-political climate in Poland 
effected by it (e.g. protest organised by the KOD movement). However, the discourse approach 
employed in this article allows to understand the role of media policy in setting the architecture 
for media governance and political communication. With regards to cultural and ideological 
principles underpinning the governance practices of policy makers, on a discoursive level, the 
public media is treated by the PiS Government as a ‘national good’, and the property of the entire 
Polish nation. An attempt to control public media takes place through an employment of familiar 
cultural themes, tropes and narratives such as “national” and “common good” or “patriotic 
values”. These familiar themes, tropes and narratives on collective identities are forms of 
imaginative identification with the discourses on nationhood (Barker and GalasiMski, 2007).  
 
Arguably, policy makers in Poland built on beliefs rooted in collective memories, cultural 
themes and values. This is explicit if we look at the notions of repolonization, depoliticization 
and decommunization which all aim to declutter public life from ‘foreign’ elements and, at the 
same time, constitute one of the main points of discursive struggle. Given that the Government 
pointed numerous times to media partisanship and political biases among journalists, the notion 
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of “strong, independent public media” has been discoursively constructed in relation to that very 
bias, which existed over the years.  In such light, the PiS could construct an image of not only a 
legal savior of the public media service, but also a guardian of national values and community.  
 
With regards to public media as a space for political communication between democratic 
institutions and citizens, the inclusion of the Polish Press Agency into the network of National 
Media, and extending a public mission status into this actor, strenghtens its po ition as a supplier 
of news. If considering the disruption of relations among media, democratic institutions and 
publics discussed by Bennett and Pfetsch (2018), in the context of the proposed media policy 
orientation, the disruption to political communication architecture emerges along the following 
lines: media independence, media pluralism, and disruption to transparency in the making of the 
policy.  
 
It is worth noting that an important aspect of regulatory framework for policy makers is 
socialisation of Polish youth, particularly in moral, national and communitarian sense. The media 
policy orientation goes hand in hand with other changes such as the one in the field of education. 
Polish youth are being conditioned to certain values, symbols, formulas (Lilleker, 2014). This 
conditioning mechanism provides citizens, especially youth, with an institutional architecture for 
making sense of the world of politics. Interestingly, thedraft document on National Media does 
not utter the phrase ‘civil society’ a single time. Further, many abstract terms have been 
introduced to the draft, for example “cooperation”, but there are very few particular solutions to 
the issues of civic participation and social inclusion. For example, media access for minorities 
tend to be treated in an instrumental way. Although the utterance “specific needs of people with 
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disabilities” appears in the Draft (Article 9, point 16), it does not require the public media to 
ensure a minimum representation levels of this social group. These regulations reinforce the 
logic of democractic representation by exclusion and incluson and ingrain them into the fabric of 
public media policy. 
Conclusions 
Since 1992, media policy has been debated as a linchpin of liberal governance, and a feature of 
democratisation in Poland. This article, however, demonstrates that democratisation is far from 
being a linear process. Our analysis unravels the dynamics of illiberal trends as an anti-pluralist 
process entangled in the making of public media policy and advancing rules for public media 
underpinned by tendency for ideological monism. To recap, the 2016 media policy was not fully 
implemented by the Government and the regulations included in ‘The Act on National Media 
Council’ are still perceived only as a temporary. The PiS Government is still keen to introduce 
new regulatory frameworks for private media as well as to tackle issues surrounding “fake 
news”. To that end, media policy continues to be a playground for the conditioning of Polish 
citizens to the style of politics, in which liberal media are targets of direct attacks, media policy 
mirrors revisionist tendencies in politics, and public media sector slides towards becoming a 
space for the re-enactment of party interests. The analysed policy is a manifestation of multi-
dimentional illiberal trends. This process involves a combination of rational means, such as 
policy changes, on the one hand, and affective measures such as fetishised ideas of common 
good, on the other. Its iteration in the Polish contexts idolises the nation which, combined with 




Further, recent media policy change put forward via legal channels in the name of the nation and 
strong patriotic and Christian values is an example of process heading into the direction of 
illiberal trends. This form of political fetishism legitimizes the erosion of democracy and 
pluralism, yet allows for existence of political opposition, something that distinguishes Polish 
case, for example, from the Hungarian one. However, illiberal trends in the context of, for 
instance the U.S., focuses on achieving ‘greatness’. In the Polish settings, it focuses on the 
preservation and restitution of values that have allegedly been destroyed by Western influences 
and previous governments, also in realm of public media policy. Protection of the national 
community along with deterioration of media freedoms, political meddling, and over-reach are 
the characterizing features of reactionary politics of media regulations in contemporary Poland. 
From this perspective, cultural narratives of nationhood are inherent elements of the process of 
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